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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: NEW YORK'S CIVIL
RIGHTS LEGISLATION -
A PATTERN OF PROGRESS
In the midst of widespread racial out-
breaks and increasing racial tension
throughout our nation, it is, indeed, timely
to analyze New York State's civil rights
record. Such a discussion necessitates an-
alysis of the Negro's legal rights in the
areas of employment, education, housing
and public accommodations- the major
targets of any possible desegregation move-
ment. Is the present legal structure in New
York sufficient to support the enforcement
of constitutionally-protected rights in a
peaceful manner or must the Negro con-
tinue to carry his fight into the streets? An
attempt is made to provide some insight
into this pivotal question.
At the outset, it is appropriate to allude
to the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution which is generally re-
ferred to as the "civil rights amendment."
It provides in part that "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 1 This
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, reads: "All per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
amendment was adopted to establish equal
enjoyment of basic civil and political rights
and to preserve these rights from discrim-
inatory action by the states based on race
or color.2
Legislation in New York has generally
embodied the spirit and purpose of the
fourteenth amendment. The New York
Constitution states that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state. It also provides that no person
shall because of race, color, creed or re-
ligion be subjected to any discrimination
in his civil rights.3
Further evidence of New York's pro-
gressive stand on civil rights may be found
in Section 290 of the Executive Law, en-
titled "The Law Against Discrimination,"
wherein it is stated:
without due process ,of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
2 Soon after the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court declared
that it is state action alone that is prohibited by
the amendment. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
3 N.Y. CONST. art. I, §11, provides: "No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws
of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person
shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation,
or institution, or by the state or any agency or
subdivision of the state."
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practices of discrimination against any of
its inhabitants because of race, creed, color
or national origin are a matter of state
concern ... such discrimination not only
threatens the rights and proper privileges
of its inhabitants but menaces the insti-
tutions and foundation of a free democratic
state and threatens the peace, order, health,
safety and general welfare of the state and
its inhabitants.
To enforce such a policy, the same statute
creates a state agency designated the State
Commission for Human Rights (formerly
known as the State Commission Against
Discrimination) .4 This agency has power
to eliminate and prevent discrimination "in
employment, in places of public accom-
modation, resort or amusement, in housing
accommodations and in commercial space
because of race, creed, color or national
origin. . ...-1
In addition to the New York State Con-
stitution and the Executive Law, a third
major source of civil rights protection is
found in the comprehensive Civil Rights
Law. In passing this statute in 1874 New
York became the second state to enact
such legislation. 6 Today after almost a cen-
tury, it still provides relief to the aggrieved
and, perhaps more important, has been the
model for many subsequent civil rights
enactments.7
4The name of the Commission was changed in
1962. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §293.
5 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §290. The Executive Law,
known as "The Law Against Discrimination" was
originally intended to apply only to discrimination
in employment. It has subsequently been amended
to include places of public accommodation, resort
or amusement and housing.
6 KONVITZ & LESKEs, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
156 (1961).
The Executive Law, particularly in its Housing
and Public Accommodation sections, has adopted
similar substantive provisions. It differs signifi-
cantly, however, in the more effective remedy
provided.
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
The Civil Rights Law [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the CRL] gives to all persons
within the jurisdiction of the state equal
rights in places of public accommodation,
resort or amusement." One section of the
CRL defines each of these terms by listing
the various types of establishments which
fall into each category.6 Although the fail-
ure of the legislature to include a particular
type of establishment in the statutory
enumeration does not necessarily exclude it
from the operation of the CRL, these
classifications are given heavy weight by
the courts. Traditionally, courts in com-
mon-law countries have strictly construed
statutes which limit the use of private pro-
perty. Therefore, they are hesitant to en-
large the establishments covered beyond
those expressly set forth by the legislature.
This reluctance of the courts is best de-
monstrated in the case of Campbell v.
Eichert.10 Here an action was brought by
a Negro woman who alleged that she was
refused manicuring service in a beauty
shop located in the defendant's department
store. She claimed such refusal took place
solely because of her race and color. The
court, in holding for defendant department
store, stated in a per curiam decision:
A beauty parlor is not specifically men-
tioned in the Civil Rights Law . . . and is
not a place of public accommodation under
the common law or under the general terms
of the statute. Where it is not conducted as
part of a barber shop a beauty parlor is not
included in that term as used in the
statute."
8 N.Y. Clv. RIGHTS LAW §40.
9 Ibid.
10 155 Misc. 164, 278 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
11 Id. at 165, 278 N.Y. Supp. at 947.
At that time only barber shops were in-
cluded in the statutory enumeration. Thus,
the unfortunate result is that the plainiff
was denied relief merely because the court
desired to engage in the niceties of legal
construction in distinguishing a barber shop
from a beauty parlor.
Another case involving the same tradi-
tional approach of strict construction is
Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club,1 2
wherein plaintiffs charged that they had
been refused the use of defendant's golf
course because they were Negroes. Here,
as in the previous case, the CRL did not
expressly include golf courses in its en-
umeration of places of public accommoda-
tion or amusement. In finding for the
defendants, the court held that the plaintiffs
had failed to sustain the burden of proving
that the golf course was a place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement and
that, in any case, the statute did not speci-
fically name golf courses among such public
places. The court was of the view that since
the CRL enumerated public places, the
legislature intended to limit its application
to the places set forth therein. They felt
any extension of the list should be a pro-
duct of the legislature rather than the
courts. Although the court of appeals af-
firmed the decision, 3 the dissent seemed
to express an approach more consistent
with the spirit of the CRL when Judge
Finch stated therein:
The words of the Civil Rights Law, "a place
of public accommodation, resort or amuse-
ment," ... show by their mere statement
that they are sufficiently broad to include
12 28 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 263 App.
Div. 710 (1st Dep't 1941), af'd, 289 N.Y. 577, 43
N.E. 2d 716 (1942).
13 Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, 289 N.Y.
577, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1963
a public golf course. The fact that the
Legislature immediately amended the stat-
ute so as specifically to include a public
golf course when the earlier language was
restricted by judicial decision, shows clearly
that the amendment was intended for clari-
fication. In addition there is no canon of
construction which is authority for a strict
construction of the statute here in ques-
tion.14
In light of New York's staunch stand
against discriminatory practices, it would
appear that the liberal view is more in
keeping with the legislative intent. Only by
a broad approach can we be assured that all
persons are receiving the equal protection
of the laws provided for by both the -state
and federal constitutions." Civil rights is
not an area calling for legalistic techni-
calities of statutory construction; rather, it
is one necessitating an approach that em-
bodies the true democratic tradition of
equality for all.
A NEW APPROACH
In order to effectuate this policy, the
legislature placed the enforcement of the
CRL in the hands of the State Commission
Against Discrimination. 16 By so vesting the
Commission with authority, the legislature
endeavored to insure that those persons dis-
criminated against would have a fair hear-
ing of their grievances. The enabling statute
of the Commission expressly orders it to
apply the act liberally. 17 From the stand-
14 Id. at 578, 43 N.E.2d at 717.
15 See notes 1 and 3 supra.
16 By virtue of an amendment to the Executive
Law in 1952, the State Commission Against Dis-
crimination was vested with authority to eliminate
and prevent discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, resort or amusement. N.Y. Ex-
ECUTIVE LAW §290.
17 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §300: "The provisions of
this article shall be construed liberally for the ac-
complishment of the purposes thereof."
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point of a prospective complainant, the
existence of the Commission also removes
the financial deterrent to obtaining civil
rights relief. To institute a lawsuit under the
old law and see it through to judgment
would cost a person discriminated against a
considerable sum. Consequently, many
were without an adequate remedy and
tolerated such discrimination as best they
could. Today, an aggrieved party need only
make a complaint to the Commission al-
leging the specific violation, and the matter
will be investigated and prosecuted, if neces-
sary, with no cost to the complainant."' The
end result of this practical approach is that
many more infractions are being reported1"
with a correspondingly better implementa-
tion of New York's strong anti-discrimina-
tion policy. In extending the jurisdiction
and procedures of the Commission to dis-
crimination in places of public accommoda-
tion, the legislature did not intend to abolish
the old remedies provided by the CRL."
This result is clearly mandated by the Ex-
ecutive Law which provides that: "Nothing
contained in this article shall be deemed to
repeal any of the provisions of the Civil
Rights Law .. .relating to discrimination
because of race, creed, color or national
origin."' 21
However, as to acts defined as unlawful
by the Executive Law, the administrative
18 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297.
19 See 1958 N.Y. State Commission Against Dis-
crimination Report.
20 Under the CRL, a civil violation carries the
possibility of fine up to $500. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
Law §41. This monetary penalty is not found in
the Executive Law, where the State Commission's
main remedy is to issue cease and desist orders.
N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297. There exists, how-
ever, the possibility of a back-pay order which
can become quite large, depending on how long
complainant has been kept off the job. Ibid.
21 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §300.
procedure provided therein is to be ex-
clusive while an action is pending, and a
final determination by the Commission acts
as a bar to any other action.22
The first case to come before the Com-
mission under the public accommodation
provisions was brought by a New York
City resident.2 3 He charged that the Castle
Hill Beach Club was a public accommoda-
tion, and that it had denied him admission
because of his color. The defendant beach
club, in turn, challenged the jurisdiction
of the Commission, maintaining that it was
a private establishment not subject to the
provisions of the Executive Law. To sub-
stantiate its claim, the beach club relied
on the fact that it had become a member-
ship corporation in 1950. Prior to this,
the defendant had operated as a commercial
enterprise and had a telephone listing under
the heading "Bathing Beaches-Public."
After its conversion, however, the telephone
listing continued as a public one, notwith-
standing the fact that the directory also
contained a listing under the heading en-
titled "Clubs." Further proof of its public
character was evidenced by the fact that
taxes were paid without the exemptions
given to bona fide private clubs and a
public bathing license was issued to it by
the City. In view of these facts, the Com-
mission held that the incorporation was
merely a sham designed to conceal the
public nature of the enterprise. The Com-
mission thereupon issued an order re-
quiring the Castle Hill Beach Club to cease
and desist from withholding or denying its
accommIodations, facilities or privileges
from the complainant, and from all others
Ibid.
23 Brown v. Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc., 1954
State Commission Against Discrimination Report
41.
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similarly discriminated against on the
grounds of race or color.
The defendant then petitioned the state
supreme court to review the Commission's
order 2 4 since statutory provision is made
for such review. 23 This statute provides,
however, that the findings of the Com-
mission as to the facts shall be conclusive
if supported by sufficient evidence on the
record considered as a whole.2 6 Hence, a
judicial review of the Commission's find-
ings is limited to the question of whether
the findings are, upon the entire record,
supported by evidence so substantial that
an inference of the existence of the facts
found may be reasonably drawn. 27 Upon
reviewing the action, the state supreme
court held that the Commission's findings
were so supported; therefore, the defendant
beach club had to comply with the cease
and desist order.
A violation of the anti-discrimination
statutes may result in criminal as well as
civil sanction. The penal provisions of the
CRL 28 are similar to those of the Ex-
ecutive Law2 9 with some worthwhile mod-
ification. Although a violation of the CRL
remains per se a criminal offense,30 the Ex-
24 Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc.
35, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd, I
App. Div. 2d 943, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1st Dep't
1956), afl'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186
162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
25 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §298: "Any complainant,
respondent or other person aggrieved by such
order of the commission may obtain judicial
review thereof ......
26 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §298.
2THolland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38,, 44, 119
N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).2
sN.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §41.
29 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §299.
30 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §41: "Any person who
... shall violate any of the provisions of section
forty . . . shall, also, for every such offense be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...."
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ecutive Law requires a wilful disobedience
of the Commission's order before criminal
sanctions are invoked.3 1 While this added
requirement might appear at first glance
to reduce the deterrent effect, of these
criminal sanctions, it actually increases their
overall effect. As previously illustrated, dif-
ficulties existed in obtaining a civil judg-
ment under the CRL. This was also true
with respect to criminal convictions since
district attorneys were usually preoccupied
with the more sensational crimes of vio-
lence. 2 The Executive Law changes the
pattern. As soon as the Commission's order
is wilfully violated, criminal sanctions
may be employed. If there is no wilful
disobedience, this means that the com-
plainant is no longer being discriminated
against, hence, there is no need for any
criminal penalty. The end result would ap-
pear to be a more effective codrse of
action for all concerned.
EMPLOYMENT
New York has also evidenced its pro-
gressive attitude by being the first state to
enact a fair employment practices statute33
which comprises part of the Executive
Law.34 The statute provides that it shall
be unlawful for an employer to refuse to
hire, or to discharge or bar from employ-
ment, any person because of his race, creed,
color or national origin, or to discriminate
against such person in compensation or
terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment." This statute also prohibits in-
31 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §299: "Any person...
who ... shall wilfully violate an order of the com-
mission, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
32 KONVITZ & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 179 (1961).
3 Id. at 199.
34 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §290.
3 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296 (1) (a).
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quiries by any employer or employment
agency concerning a job applicant's race,
creed, color or national origin.36 To be un-
lawful, this inquiry need not be direct but
may be indirect as was illustrated in Hol-
land v. Edwards.3 ' The complainant went
to the operator of an employment agency
in response to the latter's newspaper ad-
vertisement. The application form con-
tained a question as to whether the ap-
plicant's family name had ever been
changed. The applicant was also ques-
tioned concerning the religion of one of
her former employers, the maiden name
of the latter's wife and the complainant's
own national origin as reflected by her
name and schooling. When she did not
subsequently hear from the agency, the
applicant filed a complaint with the State
Commission Against Discrimination. The
Commission investigated and found the
employment agency guilty of making dis-
criminatory inquiries.38 The court of ap-
peals, in reviewing the case, upheld the
Commission and stated:
One intent on violating the Law Against
Discrimination cannot be expected to de-
clare or announce his purpose. Far more
likely is it that he will pursue his discrim-
inatory practices in ways that are devious,
by methods subtle and elusive-for we deal
with an area in which subtleties of conduct
play no small part.40
Thus, it is clear that the inquiry need not
be aimed directly at the individual's race
or religion, for an employer or employment
agency will be found to have violated the
statute whenever the conduct, considered in
36 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296 (1) (c).
37 116 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3s N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296 (1) (c).
39 Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d
581 (1954).
40 Id. at 45, 119 N.E.2d at 584.
its entirety, evidences a discriminatory pur-
pose.
While it is an unlawful practice for an
employer to refuse to hire or employ any
individual because of his race, creed, color
or national origin, it is likewise unlawful
for a racial group to try to coerce an em-
ployer into hiring and retaining a specific
percentage of members of that race with-
out regard to their individual qualifications,
thereby displacing existing employees of
different racial backgrounds.4 1 The Ex-
ecutive Law provides that:
It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice
for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel
or coerce the doing of any of the acts
forbidden under this article, or to attempt
to do so. 42
In the case of In re Young 43 which in-
volved an attempt by Negro pickets to
force certain Harlem liquor stores to buy
only from Negro salesmen, the court in
referring to the Executive Law stated:
Acts to compel another to violate the law
of the state and its public policy are against
the law. The right to speak is not absolute.
The First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States does not confer the
right to persuade others to violate the law.44
Labor Unions
Labor unions are also included within
the scope of both the CRL and Executive
Law. The CRL prohibits unions from
denying membership to individuals on the
ground of race, creed, color or national
41See N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296 (1)(a), (b).
For such a holding, see In re Young, 29 Misc. 2d
817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
42 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296(6).
4329 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
44Id. at 820, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
origin. 45 In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,4"
membership in the association was limited
to Caucasian and American Indian railway
postal clerks. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the CRL was applicable
since the association was excluding in-
dividuals from membership on grounds of
race and color. In answer to the associa-
tion's argument that the CRL impinged
upon the powers of the federal government,
the court stated:
A statute in general terms which prohibits
all labor organizations within this State,
including organizations of workers in
.government service, from discriminating on
the ground of race, creed or color violates
no public policy of the United States, does
not interfere with or impede any govern-
ment service and invades no field from
which the State is excluded by the Con-
stitution.47
Relating to unions the Executive Law
contains provisions essentially similar to
those in the CRL.4 8 It goes a step further
in one respect, however, by making it an
unlawful discriminatory practice for a labor
organization to deny or to withhold from
any qualified person because of his race,
creed, color or national origin the right
to be admitted to, or participate in, an
45 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §43: "No labor organi-
zation shall hereafter, directly or indirectly, by
ritualistic practice, constitutional or by-law pre-
scription, by tacit agreement among its members,
or otherwise, deny a person or persons member-
ship in its organization by reason of his race,
creed, color or national origin, or by regulations,
practice or otherwise, deny to any of its members,
by reason of race, creed, color or national origin,
equal treatment with all other members in any
designation of members to any employer for
employment, promotion or dismissal by such em-
ployer."
46 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944).
47 Id. at 324, 56 N.E.2d at 725.
48 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296(1) (b).
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apprenticeship training program.4 9 Further-
more, Section 815 of the Labor Law, which
contains suggested standards for ap-
prenticeship agreements, provides in sub-
division 5 that apprentices should be hired
"without any direct or indirect limitation,
specification or discrimination as to race,
creed, color or national origin."
Fair Employment and the Aged
Any discussion of civil rights in em-
ployment would be incomplete without
some mention of the protection afforded
the aged worker. While not a racial prob-
lem, it further demonstrates the thorough-
ness of New York's anti-discrimination
program. One provision of the Executive
Law makes it unlawful for an employer,
licensing agency or employment agency to
discriminate on the basis of age against
an individual between the ages of forty
and sixty-five in regard to hiring, dismis-
sing, promoting, and licensing as well as
to terms and conditions of employment. 50
It also prohibits the questioning of a pro-
spective employee about his age if such
questioning, either directly or indirectly,
evinces any limitation, specification or dis-
crimination against individuals between the
ages of forty and sixty-five 1 Legislation
such as this was necessary since many
qualified individuals were being refused
employment solely because they were
deemed "too old." This, in turn, created
a serious social and economic problem
since many persons were unemployed, yet
too young for social security or pensions.
Enforcement of Fair Employment Practices
As was seen in the area of public ac-
49 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296(1-a).
50 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296(3-a) (a).
51 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §296(3-a) (b).
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commodations, a person claiming to be
aggrieved by an unlawful employment
practice may file a complaint with the State
Commission for Human Rights .5 The mat-
ter is then investigated and if probable
cause for the complaint exists an attempt
is made to eliminate it through persua-
sion.5 3 If this informal talk fails, a formal
hearing is held at which time the Com-
mission determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 4 If the Commission finds
that the accused violated the law, it issues
a cease and desist order55 which may be
enforced by court decree.5 G Any wilful
violation of an order of the Commission
results in the perpetration of a misde-
meanor.57 The statute also provides for
judicial review of the Commission's order,58
the demand for such not being deemed a
wilful violation of the order. 9
In order to better enforce the Executive
Law, the legislature empowered the Com-
mission to adopt suitable rules and regu-
lations." Pursuant to this authorization,
the Commission promulgated a regulation
which requires every employer, employ-
ment agency and labor organization to post
52 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297. See text accom-
panying note 17 supra.
5 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297: "After the filing of
any complaint . . . if such commissioner shall
determine . . . that probable cause exists . . . he
shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the un-
lawful discriminatory practice . . . by conference,
conciliation and persuasion."
5 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297.
55 Ibid.
56 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §298.
50 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §299.
58 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §298.
5 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §299.
60 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §295(5): "The commis-
sion shall have the following functions, powers
and duties to adopt, promulgate, amend and re-
scind suitable rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this article .. "
and maintain at their establishments notices
furnished by the Commission. These notices
indicate the substantive provisions of the
Executive Law, locations of places for filing
complaints, and other pertinent informa-
tion. The right of the Commission to enact
such regulations was subsequently chal-
lenged by the owner of a licensed employ-
ment agency. 1 The plaintiff argued that
because the legislature had not acted on a
Commission-sponsored bill which speci-
fically authorized such posting, it had
voiced its disapproval of such action. The
supreme court rejected this contention by
stating:
The rules of statutory construction on
implications from legislative inaction must
be applied cautiously . . . . Frequently,
legislative bodies prefer to leave acts which
they deem administrative to administrative
agencies in the exercise of their rule-making
power. In this case, such a conclusion
appears as reasonable as the one the plain-
tiff draws. 2
An important factor in the court's de-
cision was its belief that the power to make
such a regulation was essential if the
Commission was to succeed in carrying out
its assigned task. The court reasoned that:
The Commission would be unable to carry
out the purposes of this entirely new
legislation unless it could familiarize per-
sons whom the law is intended to protect
with its provisions.... The object of the
notice is not merely to catch violators.
It is to make it manifest that there is a
State policy against discrimination in em-
ployment. ... Thirteen million people can-
not be educated as to the terms of a law of
61 Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62
(Sup. Ct. 1954), afJ'd mem., 285 App. Div. 886,
139 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dep't 1955).
621 d. at 77, 133 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
sweeping social significance unless it is
advertised.6 3
HOUSING
One of the areas in which discrimina-
tion causes the greatest social harm is that
of housing. It has been asserted that dis-
crimination in housing promotes family
instability and juvenile delinquency on the
theory that these conditions will persist
as long as families are forced to dwell in
whatever limited housing is available.64
Until the legislature acts, however, dis-
crimination against race or color in selling
or leasing real estate is not unlawful as
violative of a civil right. 65 Fortunately, the
New York Legislature sensed the need
for remedial legislation and enacted a
number of statutes that prohibit discrim-
inatory housing practices.
One of the first statutes enacted, the
Public Housing Law, provides that for
all of its purposes no person shall, because
of race, creed, color or national origin,
be subjected to any discrimination.66 It regu-
lates housing financed and administered
either wholly or partially by federal, state
or local authorities. 67 The next area des-
ignated for control was publicly-assisted
housing.68 Included in this category is
63 Id. at 78, 133 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
64 Hearings on Housing in Washington before the
United States Comm'n on Civil Rights 7 (1962).
65 Globerman v. Grand Cent. Parkway Gardens,
115 N.Y.S.2d 757, 761 (Sup. Ct. 1952), af0'd
mem., 281 App. Div. 820, 118 N.Y.S.2d 917
(lst Dep't 1953).
66 N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAW §223. Protection in
public housing can also be had under the Ex-
ecutive Law since it includes public housing as a
form of publicly-assisted housing. N.Y. EXECU-
TIVE LAW §292(11) (a).
67See N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAW §3(2), (11),
(15), (16), (1.7).
68 Publicly-assisted housing was first defined and
regulated by the CRL in 1950. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW §§18-b, 18-c. Subsequently the Executive
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housing financed in whole or in part by
a loan, the repayment of which is guar-
anteed by an agency of the federal, state or
local government.69 The main impact of
this legislation in the area of publicly-as-
sisted housing is that certain types of
privately owned housing, 70 largely urban
renewal projects and Federal Housing As-
sociation developments, are now brought
within the scope of the anti-discrimination
statutes.
7 1
The constitutionality of this legislation
was challenged7 2 when a Negro filed a com-
plaint with the State Commission Against
Discrimination charging the Pelham Hall
Apartments in New Rochelle, New York,
with refusing to lease him an apartment
because of his race. Pelham Hall argued
that legislation banning discrimination in
housing violated the constitutionally pro-
tected right of property owners to choose
the person to whom their property should
be sold or leased. Justice Eager rejected
this argument by reasoning:
Law was amended to include similar provisions.
N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §§292(11), 296(3).
69N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §18-b (3)(e); N.Y.
EXECUTIVE LAW §292(11) (d). Public assistance
may also take the form of a tax exemption or the
use of the governmental power of condemnation
to assemble a parcel of land which is then sold
to a private developer. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
§18-b(3)(a), (c); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §292
(11)(c)(1), (3).
70 The types of privately owned housing regulated
are multiple dwellings containing three or more
apartments and housing projects controlled by
one person and containing ten or more con-
tinguous units. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§18-b(3)
(e), (f), (6); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §2(11)(d)
(e), (12).
71 See KONVITZ & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 237 (1961); 9 CATHOLIC LAWYER 72
(1963).
72 New York State Comm'n Against Discrim-
ination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 10 Misc. 2d
334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The private ownership of private property,
free of unreasonable restriction upon the
control thereof, is truly a part of our way
of life, but, on the other hand, we, as a
People do hold firmly to the philosophy
that all men are created equal. Indeed,
discrimination against any individual here
on account of race, color or religion is
antagonistic to fundamental tenets of our
form of government and of the God in
whom we place our trust.73
In this connection, he stated that private
property rights are subject to the exercise
of the State's police power in the interest
of the public welfare and that legislation
such as is involved here constitutes a valid
exercise of this power.
Another argument advanced by Pelham
Hall was that the Executive Law violated
the "equal protection clause" of the four-
teenth amendment because it was limited
only to publicly-assisted housing and did
not extend to private housing.74 The court
countered this contention by stating:
A proceeding step-by-step by legislative
bodies to eliminate the practice of racial
discrimination in affairs closely connected
with the lives of our citizens is not only a
reasonable, but in view of changing times
and circumstances, a required method of
procedure in the interest of public welfare.75
Thus, even though certain areas of housing
remained unaffected by this statute, Pel-
ham Hall had not been denied equal pro-
tection under the law.
73 Id. at 341, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
74 For the basis of this argument, see N.Y.
Exctrrtva LAW §§292(11), 296(3), (5). These
subdivisions regulate privately owned housing to
some extent, but not to the degree that they cover
publicly-assisted, thus the charge of lack of "equal
protection" by Pelham Hall.
75New York State Comm'n Against Discrimina-
tion v. Pelham Hall Apt., Inc., supra note 72,
at 343, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
One of the least regulated areas both in
New York and in other jurisdictions is that
of private housing. Protection, as was seen
previously, is limited to provisions requiring
that there shall be no discrimination in con-
nection with the sale or rental of multiple
dwellings or of contiguously located hous-
ing.76 It is here that the arguments advanced
as to the "right of freedom to contract"
and the "inalienable right to possess prop-
erty" carry the strongest weight, since the
individual private homeowner relies en-
tirely on his own resources to build and
his own initiative to sell. These considera-
tions, however, must be contrasted with
New York's avowed public policr against
discrimination. If the cost of protecting
such rights of the private homeowner is too
great," then legislation should be planned
to lessen its harmful effect and, if neces-
sary, to eliminate it entirely. This is an
area, however, where any change must
of necessity be slow since private property
rights are among our most cherished tradi-
tions. When this is combined with one's
right to choose neighbors and friends, then
the need for careful consideration can
readily be seen.
Enforcement of the statutes in the
housing area is difficult. While there is a
State Commission for Human Rights whose
purpose it is to enforce these laws, it is
questionable if it can provide the remedy
that the complainant seeks. This situation
arises since it usually takes at least three
months for the Commission to come to
76 See note 74 supra. Provisions essentially similar
to those in Executive Law regarding private
housing are found in the Administrative Code of
the City of New York, Section X 41-1.0.
7 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §X 41-1.0 for an
excellent outline of the evils and corresponding
costs of discrimination in housing. See also text
accompanying note 58 supra.
a final decision. During this period the
defendant can defeat the complainant's
remedy by renting or selling to another be-
fore the Commission has reached any con-
clusion. Injunctive relief to prevent this
from happening is not available to a com-
plainant since the Executive Law provides
that the Commission's jurisdiction is ex-
clusive until a final determination is
reached.78 If the statute is to have any effect
in preventing discrimination, this exclusive
jurisdiction provision must be changed.
An infringed right without an effective
remedy does not aid the cause of civil
rights.
EDUCATION
Justifiable pride can be taken in New
York's record in enacting legislation to
prevent discrimination in education. As
part of this record New York had the
honor of being the first state to create a
specialized agency to deal with discrimina-
tion in this area.7 9 This agency was created
in order to carry out the declared policy
of the legislature which is to provide all
students with the equal opportunity to
attend state educational institutions with-
out discrimination because of race, color,
religion, creed or national origin.80 Any
78 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §300: "[A]s to acts
declared unlawful by section two hundred ninety-
six of this article, the procedure herein provided
shall, while sending, be exclusive .... "
79KoNVITZ & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 225 (1961).
80 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §313(1): "Declaration of
policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the state that the American ideal of equality of
opportunity requires that students, otherwise qual-
ified, be admitted to educational institutions with-
out regard to race, color, religion, creed or national
origin .. " An exception is made with regard to
religious or denominational educational institu-
tions. They are only forbidden to discriminate be-
cause of race, color, or national origin. Discrimina-
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1963
applicant for admission to an educational
institution of post-secondary grade,81 who
believes himself aggrieved by an unfair
educational practice, can file a complaint
setting forth the particulars thereof with
the Commissioner of Education. 2 The
Commissioner then conducts an investiga-
tion and follows procedures similar to those
of the State Commission for Human
Rights. 3 One notable exception to this
similiarity is that the Commissioner of
Education may initiate an investigation on
his own motion whenever he has reason
to believe that discrimination has been ex-
ercised against a school applicant.8 4 This
is desirable since his thorough knowledge
of enrollment procedures makes him best
equipped to determine when discrimination
is in fact being practiced.
tion as to religion and creed is permissible in these
institutions in recognition of the fundamental
American right of members of various religious
faiths to establish and maintain educational insti-
tutions exclusively or primarily for students of
their own religious faith.
81N.Y. EDuc. LAW §313(2). The term educa-
tional institution was limited to post-secondary
schools since there was no evidence that racial
or religious discrimination was practiced at public
elementary or secondary schools. Also the Educa-
tion Law in another section contained a section
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race,
creed, color, or national origin in all public
schools. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §3201. Similar pro-
tection is found in N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §40
which defines public schools as places of public
accommodation and in the N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW
§296(4) which makes it an unlawful discrimina-
tory practice for an non-sectarian education cor-
poration or association to deny the use of its
facilities to any person, otherwise qualified, by
reason of his race, color or religion.
82 N.Y. EDUc. LAW §313 (5) (a).
83 Ibid. See N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §297.
84 N.Y. EDUc. LAW §313(5)(b). "Where the com-
missioner has reason to believe that an applicant
or applicants have been discriminated against...
he may initiate an investigation on his own
motion."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The state's policy of equal educational op-
portunity for all was vividly demonstrated
in the now historic message dispatched by
Education Commissioner James E. Allen
on June 18, 1963.5 Dr. Allen's message
ordered all school districts throughout the
state to submit plans aimed at the eventual
elimination of racial imbalance. This, ac-
cording to the Commissioner, is a situation
that arises in schools having Negro en-
rollments of 50 per cent or more.86 It is
Dr. Allen's belief that such racial imbalance
constitutes a deprivation of the equality
of educational opportunity envisioned un-
der the Education Law of New York. This
belief was bolstered in part by a report
from the Commissioner's Advisory Com-
mittee on Human Relations and Com-
munity Tensions which stated:
When a "neighborhood school" becomes
improperly exclusive in fact or in spirit,
when it is viewed as being reserved for
certain community groups, or when its
effect is to create or continue a ghetto-type
situation, it does not serve the purposes of
democratic education.8 7
One possible result of the Commissioner's
directive that is certain to meet with op-
position, is the transportation of students
from their own neighborhoods to schools
of other locales s8 This is aggravated even
more so when the other neighborhood is a
85 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1963, p. 21, col. 2.
86 Dr. Allen has announced that he has no plans
to insist that school districts in the state achieve
a fifty-fifty racial balance. He admitted that per-
haps nothing can be done about integrating some
schools in a borough like Manhattan, where over-
all registration is only twenty-five per cent white.
N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 2, 1963, p. 2, col. 3.
87 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1963, p. 21, col. 1.
88 Dr. Allen is as yet undecided about the possi-
bility of transporting white students into Negro
areas to promote integration. He would look with
so-called "slum area." Parents are sure to
object strenuously for they will lose, at
the very least, the opportunity to parti-
cipate in the support and guidance of their
neighborhood schools.8 9 They will also
object to their children being subject to
conditions of an area not of their own
choosing. These are valid objections that
merit serious consideration. How well the
Commissioner's plan works in practice can
only be determined through compliance
and use. As it stands now, however, it is
a dramatic step forward toward achieving
the greatest possible measure of complete
integration in our school system.
CONCLUSION
Against a backdrop of nationwide con-
cern over civil rights, New York stands
out as a leader in eliminating discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, creed, color or
national origin. It has promoted the passage
from ancient habits of prejudice to the
development of opportunities based on
merit, in which human worth is the sole
measure of a man's right to work, to live
and to enjoy the public facilities.
However, the questions raised by the
recent civil rights demonstrations have be-
come critical. The Negro has despaired of
the gradualism of court desegregation. Does
this mean that the extensive civil rights legis-
lation in New York is inadequate? It is sub-
mitted that New York's legislation, although
imperfect in several respects, is far-reaching
enough so that the Negro can obtain more
than just a gradual desegregation and, yet,
not one which would be revolutionary.
disfavor upon such a plan unless it can be proved
to be educationally effective. N.Y. Herald Tribune,
July 2, 1963, p. 2 col. 5.
89 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1963, p. 21, col. 5.
 
